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Preface 
This second working paper within the series of reports on the ongoing 
activities in IIASA's International Gas Study presents some test applications of 
the GATE-I model (Gas Trade, Integrated Version). The general outline of this 
model can be found in the report, "Model of European Gas Production, Trade 
and Consumption" [3]. The GATE-I model has been applied to demonstrate the  
feasibility of modeling natural gas scenarios and the corresponding gas trade 
among the European subregions. 
Altogether four scenarios were developed: a base case that  provides an ini- 
tial test of the prospects for natural gas in future energy strategies for the 
European continent and indicates the  trade links needed to meet expected 
demand; a scenario in which different export price-to-quantity relations are 
assumed for the gas exporting regions of the Soviet Union and North Mrica; a 
supply security scenario that  incorporates some gas import dependency policy 
considerations; and a scenario in which environmental aspects are considered 
in terms of the costs of meeting SO2 emission reduction requirements for 
enhanced natural gas consumption. 
In sum, given the simplification needed to keep GATE-I relatively compact 
and computationally fast, the main objectives of the excercise have been fully 
met. The quantitative results of applying the model to the  analysis of gas pros- 
pects for the above regions should not be considered conclusive, but are sug- 
gestive of possible trends with respect to  gas use in these regions. The prelim- 
inary analysis is currently being followed up with more detailed investigations. 
H-H. Rogner 
Leader 
International Gas Study 
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INTRODUrnON 
At the outset of the IIASA International Gas Study the Energy Systems 
Group recognized the necessity of deploying an adequate methodological frame- 
work [I]. Thus work on designing a set of models was initiated in January 1904, 
a t  the time the Study was formally begun. The goal is a set of models reflecting 
the regional aggregation of the European continent into major exporters and 
importers of natural gas; these models will account explicitly for the particular 
conditions of the energy system in each of the regions. The model set will 
include a trade model (GATE-L) that links the regional models. 
Clearly the task of compiling the necessary data and information for 
developing and calibrating the regional models will require some months. Thus 
in the interim an integrated version of the model set  (GATE-I) was developed 
and demonstrated a t  the European Gas Meeting held a t  IlASA from April 16-17, 
1984. In developing this pilot model special attention was given to the problem 
of modeling natural gas trade among the subregions of Europe, given 
conMcting objectives between exporters, between exporters and importers, or 
between both. 
The principal idea guiding the design of pilot model GATE-I was described in 
[2]. Briefly, GATE-I possesses the follomlng features: 
(a) It covers the entire energy chain, from resource extraction to end 
use conversion; 
(b) It encompasses all of the subregions of the European continent (East 
and West) which eventually will'be accounted for by the individual 
models; 
(c> It accounts for the potential role of natural gas in interfuel substitu- 
tion, given economics of gas usage and the  competitiveness of gas a t  
burner tip; 
(dl It can determine regional indigenous natural gas supply, gas import 
desires, and export potentials; balance natural gas demand and sup- 
ply; and define the corresponding market clearing gas price(s). 
Hence, GATE-I comprises, in simplified form, all essential features of the 
planned set  of regional models, including the trade algorithm of GATE-L. The 
degree of simplification and the necessary aggregation was governed by the 
absolute minimum requirements for analyzing interfuel substitution, i.e. corn- 
petitiveness of natural gas in various energy markets, and interregional gas 
trade. 
This report describes a first attempt in applying this general methodologi- 
cal framework and some preliminary quantitative results. I t  is important to 
stress that the primary purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate the feasi- 
bility of this modeling approach for accounting for the physical flows of energy 
from resource extraction to end-use conversion and natural gas trade flows. 
This involved limiting the present analysis to a single objective functional mode 
(cost-minimization). Thus the four scenarios presented in this report should be 
viewed only from the perspective of testing the methodology and related com- 
puter software. Neither the assumptions about future development of the 
model's exogenous parameters and variables nor the numerical results 
obtained should be considered conclusive. 
The geographic aggregation used for the GATE-I model differs slightly from 
the configuration presented in the study outline [I]. Again, the regional aggre- 
gation serves the  purposes of demonstrating the important features of the 
GATE-I model: practicability was awarded higher priority than perfect reflection 
of all regional energy systems modeled within GATE-I. For example. the 
regional energy systems of the gas exporting regions (Soviet Union, Norway and 
North Africa), are reflected only to the extent necessary for the analysis of gas 
export profiles. The off-shore gas fields commonly referred to  as Norwegian gas 
are labeled North Sea, North Africa is used as an acronym for not  only Algerian 
gas but all other potential African and Middle East gas exporters. 
Table 1 shows the composition of the gas importing regions used in this 
exercise: East Europe consists of the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance) countries. except the Soviet Union; North Europe comprises Norway, 
Sweden and Finland; South Europe includes all European countries a t  the Medi- 
terranean Sea except France; and Central Europe comprises the  nine member 
countries of the Commission of European Communities (CEC) except ltaly plus 
the remaining Western European nations not otherwise accounted for. 
Table 1. Aggregation of the European Countries into Regions. 
Central Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherland, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
East Europe Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Republic of Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania 
North Europe Finland, Norway. Sweden 
South Europe Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Yugoslavia 
Regional Energy Systems in GATE-I 
The representation of the regional energy systems emerged from an ini- 
tially uniform structure for all regions which was modified to reflect the energy 
system characteristic of the individual regions. Figure 1 shows the initial 
structure of the regional energy systems: The primary energy resources con- 
sidered are coal, oil, gas, nuclear power, and hydropower*. the  fossil energy 
'Nuclear energy and hydropower quantities are expressed in terms of thermal oil 
equivalent. 
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Figure 1.  The Reginnnl Energy Syd,em. 
forms can be either domestically extracted or imported, or both. The next 
stage in this schematic representation of the energy chain concerns the  
conversion of fossil and nonfossil fuels into electricity or, when necessary, the  
up-grading of fuels, e.g. the refining of crude oil into such products as light oil 
(including gasoline. gasoil, LPG) and fuel oil. 
The different forms of secondary energy, i.e. solids (primarily coal), light 
oil, fuel oil, gas, electricity and district heat (the latter used here only for 
North Europe) are delivered to consumers by means of transmission and distri- 
bution technologies. Finally, a t  the site of final energy consumption the 
delivered energy (in the form of final energy) is converted into useful energy. 
All components of the regional energy systems are  represented by a set  of 
technological data such as conversion/transmission efficiencies, plant life, 
average operation-time per year, etc. 
The useful energy demand sectors common to  all gas importing regions 
are: 
- Thermal energy needs in household and service sectors, primarily consist- 
ing of space and water heat; 
- Thermal energy needs in industries, i.e. low- and high-temperature process 
heat,  space heat, etc.; 
- Specific uses of electricity, including all areas of electricity consumption 
where no substitution by other fuels is envisaged over the next decades; 
and 
- Specific uses of liquid fuels. i.e. the fuel requirements of the transport sec- 
tor and the nonenergy liquid fuel demand. 
Natural gas exports originating from the USSR and North Africa are deter- 
mined by means of export supply functions which simply relate export prices to 
the marginal quantities demanded. Within GATE-I, USSR gas export prices are  
given in terms of c.i.f. a s  of the  CMEAflestern Europe border (e.g. the point of 
entry a t  the Austrian border). The transport costs of Siberian gas from the 
Urengoy fields to the Western European border are considered as part of the 
Soviet gas export prices, i.e. the export prices are subject to the USSR export 
and foreign currency earning policies and not necessarily to actual cost 
recovery considerations. 
North African gas export prices are calculated in terms of the average 
f.0.b. a t  the outlet of the gas fields to the trunk line. Figure 2 gives the assump- 
tions regarding the price-quantity relations underlying this analysis. Natural 
gas reserves/resources of either the USSR or North Africa were not reflected 
explicitly within the GATE-I applications for two reasons. First, the gas 
resources of both regions are considered plentiful over the time horizon of the 
study. and secondly. it seems reasonable to  assume the  willingness of both to 
export, provided that  sufficient net  backs can be materialized. 
North Sea gas reserves and resources are, however, taken into considera- 
tion explicitly. In GATE-I these are  four reserve/ resource categories, each of 
which is characterized by different technoeconomic parameters and extraction 
technologies. The average extraction costs of North Sea gas and the  
corresponding reserve/resource potentials are  given in Table 2. 
The largest natural gas producer among the net  gas importing regions has 
thus far been the Netherlands. In addition to supplying some 50 percent of 
domestic primary energy needs with natural gas, the  Netherlands have 
exported considerable amounts of gas to the countries of the Central European 
region a s  well as to  Italy (South Europe). Given the size of Dutch natural gas 
Price [$/kWyr] 
o ! : : : : : : : : t ! : : : : : : : : ! :  
50 - 100 150 200 250 
Export Quantity [GWyrIyr] 
Figure 2. Relationships Between Gas Export Revenues and Willingness to Export 
for the USSR and North Africa in the GATE-I Pilot Version (Base Case). 
Table 2. Gas Extraction Cost and Resource Potential per Region. 
Cost Potential 
Region Category $/kWyr $/ 1 O ~ B T U  l"Wyra 
North Sea Cheap 1 42.6 1.4 1.0 
Cheap 2 59.6 2.0 3.0 
Expensive 1 90.2 3.0 4.0 
Expensive 2 105.2 3.5 4.0 
Central Europe Onshore 1 26.4 0.9 1.0 
Onshore 2 45.4 1.5 3.5 
Offshore 1 60.0 2.0 1.5 
Offshore 2 100.0 3.3 5.0 
Deep 317.4 7.3 10.0 
East Europe Cheap 26.4 0.9 1.0 
Expensive 42.6 1.4 2.5 
North Europe Deep 317.4 10.6 5.0 
South Europe Cheap 31.5 1.1 0.3 
Expensive 65.5 2.2 1.0 
Deep 317.4 10.6 5.0 
3 
'1 TWyr of natural gas is equivalent to  846.4 billion m . 
reserves/resources, the current gas exporting policy of the Netherlands, and 
the fact that Dutch gas exports largely remain within Central Europe, Dutch gas 
has been treated as a domestic resource of the Central Europe region. Clearly, 
the gas production level for the  Central European region had to be constrained 
so as to be consistent with Dutch policy on gas. The extraction costs and gas 
reserve/resources of the Netherlands, Central Europe, East Europe, North 
Europe, and South Europe are given in Table 2. 
Gas Trade Flows 
The interregional gas trade flow possibilities in the GATE-I model are based 
on the existing European trunk line grid as well as the planned extensions (see 
Figure 3). The level of use of the existing gas transmission infrastruc;ture and 
new transport capacities are subject to the cost-optimizing objective function 
(with the exception of the USSR-Western Europe trunk lines). As already men- 
tioned, the  gas trunk lines (and the  entire gas distribution infrastructure) are 
treated as individual technologies each with its own technoeconomic charac- 
teristics. 
NORTH EUROPE 4- USSR 
NORTH SEA CENTRAL EUROPE EAST EU ROPE 
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Figure 3. Possible Gas Flows. 
Costs and Prices ' GATE-I 
The technical data characterizing the various activities of extraction, 
primary-to-secondary conversion, transmission/distribution and end-use 
conversion are supplemented by a number of cost and price parameters. 
These parameters comprise unit investment costs, and fixed and variable 
operation and maintenance costs. Fuel costs are accounted for separately 
along the entire energy chain; they are simply the result of adding up all the 
technology costs that  have been incurred up to  the point of fuel consumption. 
At this point the distinction between costs and prices beconles a vital issue. All 
indigenous operations are  quoted in terms of their costs, which as such are  
market prices. For example the investment costs and operation and 
maintenance costs associated with a specific technology can be considered as 
market prices in real terms. Or all energy imports are given in market prices. 
However, the corresponding output of this technology is quoted in terms of 
costs, i.e. without profits, taxes, etc. Thus, linking a number of technologies 
distorts the distinction between costs and prices. Furthermore, a t  the end-use 
level different prices are often associated with the same fuel depending on the 
scale of consumption. Therefore,. a systematic approach had to be defined 
which compensates for this inconsistency between costs and prices. 
In the GATE-I model historically observed rates for profits, taxes and other 
related costs were added to the  output cosJs whenever necessary--i.e. before 
the energy flow enters another stage within the energy conversion chain or 
before it  reaches the final consumer. A t  the end-use level, existing fuel price 
differentials between large consumers (industry) and households were retained. 
Dynamics and Constraints in GATE-I 
The dynamics of the  CAE-I model over the 30-year study horizon are 
determined largely by the following factors: 
Changes o j  the objec t ive  g rad ien t  w h i c h  in this model  m e a n s  changes  in 
c o s t s  or  pr ices .  Generally all costs and prices are quoted in real U S  dollars at 
1980 prices and exchange rates. Essentially this implies constant costs and 
prices over the entire study horizon. There are, however, a number of excep- 
tions where real price changes were introduced. For example, nongas import 
prices are assumed to rise (see Table 3). Further, the gas (fuel) extraction 
costs and in subsequent stages gas (fuel) prices increase in accordance with 
the rate of depletion of conventional and inexpensive resources. 
Table 3. Price of Coal and Crude Oil Imports. 
Price in 1985 Growth (%/yr) 
Fuel $/kWyr $/ 1 O ~ B T U  1985-2000 2000-201 0 
Crude Oil 242 8.1 2 1.5 
Coal 200 6.7 2 1.5 
Dynamic  cons t ra in t s .  Maximum growth rates for the buildup of certain 
technologies. Dynamic capacity buildup constraints prevent sudden and total 
shifts from one technology to another. These constraints reflect the  inherently 
long lead-times required to  introduce major structural changes in complex sys- 
tems, such as energy systems. 
Resource cons tra ints  Limiting the to ta l  m e  o j  a ca tegory  of r e s o u r c e s  o v e r  
the  30 y e a r  t i m e  hor izon.  Technical and economic considerations restrict the 
utilization of nuclear power plants to base load supply and disregard the  gen- 
eration of peak load electricity. Consequently, the contribution of nuclear 
power to electricity supply depends on the shape of the demand load curve. In 
the CATE-I model nuclear energy was confined to a maximum contribution of 35 
percent of total electricity supply in the regions of Western Europe. Nuclear's 
share in electricity generation for East Europe was fixed a t  a maximum of 80 
percent due to the  relatively flat load curve and the CMEA policy of strongly 
enhancing the deployment of nuclear power. 
Regional policy considerations. Security supply of considerations may 
impose ceilings on the supply dependency of a region or regions on any fuel 
(here natural gas) exporting region. For the current analysis the default max- 
imum dependence of the Western European regions on a single gas exporting 
region is essentially unconstrained, i.e. the value adopted is 90 percent. 
Future energy demand profile. The growth of useful energy demand is one 
of the  major dynamic forces affecting the  development of regional energy sys- 
tems. The demand projections adopted in the  present analysis (see Table 4) 
were derived from the  low projections of the International Energy Agency [3]. 
Table 4. Energy Demand Projections per Region (GWyr/yr). 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
North Europe 
HH TH 17.3 16.7 16.7 17.0 
IND TH 19.2 21.0 23.0 24.9 
SP ELEC 17.2 18. 1 19.0 20.0 
SP LIQU 26.6 26.6 26.9 27.4 
Central Europe 
HH TH 201.3 200.3 214.8 230.3 
IND TH 154.4 158.3 164.8 173.2 
SP ELEC 83.9 92.7 106.5 123.6 
SP LJQU 290.2 294.6 306.6 322.3 
South Europe 
HH TH 42.4 47.4 52.9 58.7 
IND TH 68.4 77.1 92.1 106.9 
SP ELEC 29.1 33.1 38.4 44.6 
SP LJQU 97.2 98.7 103.7 110.1 
East Europe 
HH TH 88.3 100.0 134.4 198.9 
IND TH 150.6 183.6 246.7 331.6 
SP ELEC 31.6 35.6 41.3 48.0 
SP LJQU 53.0 58.5 66.6 75.8 
NOTE: HH TH is thermal use in the  household sector; IND TH is  thermal use in 
the  industrial sectors; SP ELEC is specific electricity; and SP LIQU is specific 
liquids. 
Scenarios and Model Applications 
Prior to any modeling analysis of this kind i t  is necessary to  calibrate the  
model to the  base year or better the  dynamics of the past. A careful model cali- 
bration enables one to  reflect more accurately the energy flows along the  
entire energy chain, the existing stock of energy production capacities and 
their utilization, the age structure of the energy infrastructure, etc. In other 
words, the model should reflect the historical development of the energy sys- 
tems as closely as possible. Clearly, there are limits to the goodness of fit 
between historical observations and model calculations. For example. the 
GATE-I model is  a member of the MESSAGE I1 model family which in turn belongs 
to the class of dynamic linear/nonlinear programming models. These types of 
optimization models are difficult if not impossible to calibrate correctly 
because the  real world rarely functions optimally. Also, a model can only be a 
simplified representation of reality. Consequently. the model's image of the 
energy systems will always differ from reality. 
Given the available statistics, 1980 proved to be an appropriate base year 
for this analysis. The principal setup of the base year, the data used, etc. can 
be found in 121. Primary and final energy consumption in the four European 
gas importing regions is summarized in Tables 5a and 5b. 
Table 5a. Primary Energy Consumption, 1980 (GWyr/yr). 
Crude Natural ~ l e c - ~  
Europe Solids Oil Gas ~ u c l e a r ~  ~ ~ d 1 - 0 ~  tricity- Total 
North 21.0 64.7 2.4 11.4 40.9 0.2 140.6 
Central 311.1 593.7 216.0 57.8 53.3 -0.6 1231.3 
South 65.2 251.2 39.4 2.4 33.6 0.9 392.7 
East 323.5 144.1 89.2 7.8 9.1 5.4 579.1 
Total 720.8 1053.7 347.0 79.4 136.9 5.9 2343.7. 
a ~ i v e n  as primary energy equivalent. 
Table 5b. Knal Energy Consumption, 1980 (GWyr/yr). 
Petroleum Natural 
Europe Solids Products Gas Electricity Total 
North 15.2 56.1 0.7 24.2 96.2 
Central 93.3 498.3 179.5 118.1 889.2 
South 32.3 178.1 35.1 39.8 285.3 
East 216.8 124.1 69.8 41.9 452.6 
Total 357.6 856.6 285.1 224.0 1723.3 
Four scenarios were explored in this analysis. The first scenario--the Base 
Case--provides an initial test of the prospects for natural gas in future energy 
strategies for the European continent, and indicates the trade links necessary 
to meet  expected demands. The Base Case represents a relatively uncon- 
strained scenario where the  potential of natural gas consumption has been 
determined entirely by economic considerations. i.e. burrier competitiveness 
versus alternative fuels a t  the end-use side and net-back yields for the gas 
producers/exporters. . 
The second scenario assumed different export price-to-quantity !elations 
for USSR and North African gas; the third scenario incorporated some gas 
import dependency policy considerations. The fourth scenario incorporates 
environmental aspects by means of confronting the costs of sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
emission reductions with enhanced natural gas consumption. 
Common to all scenarios is the  regional economic outlook up to the year 
2010. As mentioned above, the economic factors and to that  extent assump- 
tions about future useful energy demand are  based on the low projections of the 
IEA analysis. Although the assumed aggregate economic outlook for Europe is 
modest, there are notable differences among the regional prospects. For exam- 
ple, there is the North-South disparity in economic well-being. The potential 
for traditional rates of economic growth appears to be larger for South Europe 
than for North Europe or Central Europe. Therefore the assumed energy 
demand growth rates of South Europe exceeds those of the other Western Euro- 
pean regions. The growth assumptions for East Europe are based on personal 
communication with experts from the CMEA region. 
Different regional energy demand growth rates have certain implications 
for the  market penetration potential of natural gas. Generally, a low energy 
growth profile is not as favorable for the expansion of any specific form of 
energy supply as an accelerated growth situation. While in the latter situation 
the market penetration of, say, natural gas could be eased simply by absorbing 
the supply of the incremental demand, in a low growth environment any further 
market  penetration means the displacement of other fuels. 
Another set of exogenous parameters common to all scenarios is the  non- 
gas energy import prices (see Table 3). Further, all dynamic capacity build-up 
constraints, etc. were kept unchanged throughout the scenarios. 
The Base Case 
North h ~ o p e .  The energy demand outlook of North Europe is character- 
ized by low growth rates of less than 0.5 percent per year for the period up to 
the  turn of the century. All three countries of this region have successfully 
advanced the concepts of energy conservation along the entire energy chain 
during the 1990s. Furthermore, structural economic change has resulted in 
strong shifts away from energy intensive activities. The demographic outlook 
appears relatively stable and other socioeconomic indicators point to an almost 
constant demand for energy-consuming equipment, ranging from housing 
requirements t o  household devices. Hence, there is little margin left for dras- 
tic increases in energy consumption. Most of the effective energy savings 
measures will have been be implemented by the year 2000, so that  few addi- 
tional savings can be expected thereafter. This leads eventually t o  somewhat 
higher energy demand growth rates after the  turn of the century than those 
observed for the years preceding this period. 
On the supply side the nations of North Europe have adapted their domes- 
tic energy systems to their specific national resource situations. Apart from 
Norway, North Europe is poorly endowed with conventional fossil resources and 
both Sweden and Finland import some 50 percent of their primary energy con- 
sumption in the form of crude oil and oil products. During the 1970s both coun- 
tries used their considerable peat resources and explored efficient uses of wood 
resources. 
The only noteworthy energy resource available in all Rorth European coun- 
tries is hydropower. In 1980 Sweden and Pu'orway generated 60 and 99 percent of 
their electricity needs from hydropower, respectively; hydroelectricity contri- 
buted 25 percent to electricity supply in Finland. Nuclear power plays an 
important role in the  fossil resource poor countries of North Europe. Swedish 
and Finnish nuclear power stations produced 28 and 17 percent of total domes- 
tic electricity consumption respectively, which by international standards 
ranks them high among the  nations producing electricity by nuclear power. 
The large contribution of hydroelectricity and nuclear power to  domestic 
energy supply is also reflected in the high electricity share of some 25 percent 
in North Europe's final energy consumption (which is tnrice the share of these 
two sources in the final energy consumption of Central Europe). 
Historically gas has played a negligible role in North Europe's energy sup- 
ply menu. Because of lacking or undiscovered natural gas resources, the small 
quantity of gas produced originated as by-products (e-g. naphta in refineries, or  
coke oven and furnace gas) which was then utilized in town-gas systems. 
Energy conservation and import diversification have been the  main objec- 
tives of Sweden's and Finland's energy policies. Progress in t h e  long-distance 
transport of gas and the  development of Norway's off-shore gas fields created 
new prospects for the introduction of natural gas in Sweden and Finland. A 
number of feasibility projects have been launched to examine the gas import 
possibilities from both the  USSR and Norway. 
Investigations have indicated good prospects for natural gas in Scandinavia 
and have resulted already in definite contracts. Finland recently decided to  
import natural gas from the USSR, and the  construction of a pipeline has 
begun. Sweden will soon import some Danish gas to the southern parts of the  
country. Other gas import alternatives a re  being investigated. 
Norway's current energy policy does not consider the consumption of 
natural  gas in domestic energy markets. Norway has the lowest population den- 
sity of Europe, and these are only a few areas of sufficient energy demand densi- 
ties to justify building a gas distribution infrastructure. Furthermore, the  avai- 
lability of domestic oil reserves currently overshadows the gas option. 
The Base Case calculations indicate the continuation of the  present trend 
regarding the development of North Europe's energy system (see Figure 4). 
Hydropower expands from 152 TWh(e)/yr in 1980 to 180 TWh(e)/yr in 2010, 
nuclear electricity production increases by 160 percent, whereas for both 
sources the major capacity additions take place after 1990. (We note tha t  in this 
analysis the  consequences of the 1980 Swedish referendum on nuclear energy 
have not been incorporated) 
The consumption of solid fuels (e-g. coal, peat, wood, shale oil) remains 
basically stable over the  30 year period, while oil consumption is reduced from 
its 1980 share of 49 percent to 31 percent by 2000 and to some 28 percent by 
2010. The increases in nuclear and hydropower compensate for 50 percent 
reduction in oil use while the remaining 50 percent is covered by natural gas. 
By the  year 2010 natural gas contributes 12.5 GWyr (or 7.7 percent) to  North 
Europe's primary energy supply. In the  light of the practically nonexisting gas 
infrastructure, the geographic pattern and absolute values of energy demand 
densities for natural gas appear reasonable. 
The composition of 6nal energy consumption indicated tha t  natural gas 
faces strong competition in North Europe's energy market. Electricity expands 
its traditionally strong position in North Europe from 25 percent in 1980 to 
some 30 percent by the year 2010 (see Figure 5). Liquid fuels contribute 40 
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percent in 2010 (down from 55 percent in 1980), two-thirds of which are  
required to  satisfy specific liquid needs. This is, over the  period oil use for ther- 
mal needs is reduced by more than 50 percent compared to the base year liquid 
fuel consumption. Liquid fuel for thermal uses is consumed mainly in the  
household/service sectors, while in the  industrial sectors gas and solid fuels 
almost totally substitute for liquids. Gas consumption is restricted to  larger 
consumers such as industries tha t  have sufficient energy demand densities t o  
make gas economically attractive. 
Central Europe. In 1980 Central Europe's primary energy consumption 
amounted to  1231 GWyr, which corresponds t o  more than two-thirds of the  
energy use in all of Western Europe. Central Europe includes the  major 
economically active countries of Europe; thus  the  future economic and energy 
outlook of Western Europe will largely be shaped by economic developments, 
say, in t h e  Federal Republic of Germany, France, or  the  United Kingdom. In 
te rms of energy availability the  region of Central Europe has few fossil 
resources, which are also often expensive to  recover. Consequently, this region 
has become the  largest energy (mostly crude oil) importing region worldwide. 
The UK is the  only country with significant oil resources; but even these 
reserves supposedly are  insufficient to  maintain a production level above 
domestic needs in the long run. 
Similar to North Europe, the  national energy systems within the  Central 
European region reflect the difference in national resource endowments. For 
example, the  FRG and UK have the  largest coal resources of Western Europe; 
although not  necessarily based on cost considerations domestic coal supplies 
almost a third of these countries primary energy needs. Coal use in t h e  
remaining Central European countries amounted t o  some 17 percent in 1980 
(or one-half the  share of the  traditional coal producing countries); of this 
amount more than 65 percent was imported. Altogether coal contributed 25 
percent to  th is  region's primary energy supply in 1980. 
Natural gas resources are  concentrated in the Netherlands and off-shore of 
the  UK; minor gas resources can  be found in the  Netherland's neighboring 
countries. Not surprisingly. the  Netherlands and the UK are among the  largest 
gas consumers of Central Europe, i.e. almost 50 and 20 percent of their domes- 
tic primary energy consumption, respectively, in 1980. However. the  situatin 
for natural gas is unlike that  of coal where major producers turn out to be the  
major consumers. For example in 1980 natural  gas held a 16 percent share  in 
the  energy supply menu of the  FRG and France. The existence of a gas distribu- 
tion and consumption infrastructure in the  FRG and many other Central Euro- 
pean countries (often in place since the  last  century when it accommodated 
coal-generated town-gas) has facilitated the  market  penetration of natural gas 
beyond t h e  point determined by domestic resource availability. In particular, 
during the  1960s and the  1970s gas imports from the  Netherlands enabled, for 
example, t h e  FRG and France t o  base major parts of their energy systems on 
natural gas. The UK, the second major gas producer in Central Europe, absorbs 
all domestically produced gas and still has not yet reached selfsufficiency. Gas 
imports from the  North Sea (Norway) and from Algeria (in form of liquefied 
natural  gas--LNG) supplement natural gas supplies from UK's off-shore fields. 
In summary, in 1980 the  gas picture of Central Europe was dominated by 
the  Netherlands which produced 99.4 GWyr o r  46 percent of the  gas consumed 
in t h e  region. Of the total of 216 GWyr of natural gas consumed in Central 
Europe. 56.8 GWyr were imported: 32.3 GWyr from the North Sea. 22.2 GWyr from 
the  USSR, and 2.3 GWyr from North Africa. 
The potential for hydropower appears to be limited. The UK and the FRG, 
which together consume more than half of this region's primary energy, have 
almost reached the full potential of their relatively insignificant hydro 
resources. France and the countries located in the Alpine areas are somewhat 
better off, but in terms of the aggregate no large expansion is expected for Cen- 
tral Europe in relative terms over and above the current 4 percent of primary 
energy supply. The future of nuclear power must be viewed from the perspec- 
tive of the different national policies. Generally, the prospects are good, 
although major contributions from this technology will depend on its economic 
competitiveness and sociopolitical factors. 
The useful energy demand outlook for Central Europe resembles that for 
North Europe: Economic activity is assumed to recover slowly and the effects of 
both structural change and energy conservation result in the  low energy 
demand projections shown in Table 4. Thus, natural gas must penetrate a stag- 
nating market and compete with the well established energy carriers oil, solids 
(coal), and to a lesser extent  electricity. 
Before turning to  the  numerical calculations of the Base Case, i t  is neces- 
sary to recall some of the exogenous constraints imposed on the future 
development of Central Europe's energy system. For example, nuclear gen- 
erated electricity has a ceiling of 35 percent of total electricity production. 
Hydropower, which is constrained by the region's lack of suitable rivers, 
becomes very expensive at  the margin. Domestic coal extraction to a certain 
extent was forced into the model solution so as to reflect various national coal 
programs t o  support domestic coal use as opposed to using less expensive 
imported coal or other alternatives. 
The final energy use in Central Europe (see Figure 6) is marked by the sub- 
stitution of natural gas for liquid fuels (oil products). Natural gas expands its 
market share from some 20 percent in 1980 to 28.7 percent by 2010 a t  the 
expense of liquid fuels which drop from 56 percent to  43.6 percent over the 
study period. Hence, natural gas absorbs about three-quarters of the reduc- 
tions in liquid fuel use. The remaining quarter is supplied by electricity (up to 
16 percent from 13.3 in 1980) and some minor increases in solid fuels. 
It is interesting to  consider how the energy market is affected by this 
interfuel substitution. Unlike the situation in North Europe, in Central Europe 
gas penetrates the household and service sectors a t  a much higher rate than 
the industrial sectors. In the small users/household category gas consumption 
increases from one-third (in 1980) to two-thirds of useful thermal energy supply 
in 2010. Apparently, gas has reached an economically defined limit in this 
marke t  Gas covers all areas with sufficiently high energy demand densities 
where the gas distribution infrastructure costs are not yet so high as to prohi- 
bit gas' competitiveness. In reality, a share of maximum 60 percent might not 
be obtained. Gas substitutes not only for liquid fuels, but also for solids and 
electricity. This may suggest some overoptimistic assumptions within the Base 
Case scenario and the need to further analyze and modify the  energy density 
areas underlying this pilot analysis. 
Gas use for thermal purposes in industries grows a t  a slower rate than its 
direct competitors solids and electricity. This is a direct consequence of the 
domestic coal extraction assumed in this scenario. The lower limit of domestic 
coal production forces to  open the question of how to use this coal. Coal 
combustion for electricity generation or for process heat supply in large indus- 
trial plants is the  most economical approach. Both the indirect and direct 
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effects of the coal policy in Central Europe restrict the expansion of natural gas 
in the  industrial thermal market.  But there is another reason for the  limited 
market for gas. Specific liquid fuel uses amount to  one-third of final energy 
demand comprising the  gasoline and diesel needs of the  transport sector, etc. 
An essentially unavoidable by-product of gasoline and diesel production is heavy 
fuel oil (the operational mode of the Central European refineries are assumed 
to produce a minimum of 10 percent fuel oil output). Similar t o  coal, the  fuel 
oil market consists of electric utilities and industries. Hence, fuel oil main- 
tains a market share of almost 19 percent within the  industrial thermal 
market. 
In summary, in Central Europe gas continues t o  dominate the  industrial 
thermal market but faces competition from both coal and electricity. By the 
end of the study horizon gas supplies 39 percent (up from 36), fuel oil 19 per- 
cent (down from 28), solids (coal) 30 percent (up from 26), and electricity 13 
percent (up from 10). 
The electricity sector of Central Europe (see Figure 7) is  characterized by 
a strong market penetration of nuclear power. which increases its market share 
from 15 percent in 1980 t o  the  maximum contribution permitted in this 
scenario of 32 percent or  519 TWh(e). which corresponds t o  an annual installa- 
tion of approximately 2 GW(e) over the next 30 years. Hydroelectricity 
decreases in relative t e rms  from 13.7 to 12.6 percent but  in absolute kwh pro- 
duced hydropower expands by some 20 percent to 193 TWh(e)/yr by 2010. 
Electricity generation based on coal remains almost stable throughout the  
study period. The 600 TWh(e) produced towards the end of the  period reflect a 
market share of 39 percent  (1980: 47 percent) and a slight increase of coal 
combustion of 9 percent. Light oil as a fuel for electricity generation is discon- 
tinued by 1990, with the  phaseout of fuel oil completed by 2010. 
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Figure 7. Central Europe: Electricity Generation. 1980-2010, Base Case. 
The role of gas in the  electricity market appears to be that of a swing sup- 
plier. Since most of the  other options are constrained, gas not only displaces 
oil products in peak load supply. but also steps in whenever there occurs a gap 
that must be filled. Hence, the  gas input to electricity supply varies over the 
period from 10.4 and 14.6 percent. 
The primary energy consumption of Central Europe grows by 0.3 percent 
annually and reaches 1352 GWyr by 2010. Figure 8 illustrates the dynamics of 
the substitution of natural gas and nuclear power for crude oil and to a lesser 
extent for coal. Crude oil consumption decreases from 48 to 34 percent while a 
substantial part of this decline is offset by the increase of gas from 18 to some 
27 percent. Nuclear power expands by seven percentage points and contributes 
11.8 percent to primary energy supply in 2010. 
In summary the Central European region offers good prospects for the 
market penetration of gas. However, the numerical results--in no way 
definitive-indicate that  natural gas as  a stationary fuel may be confined by an 
upper ceiling. Although the present calculations are based on assumptions that 
favor the expansion of gas, only 27 percent (as compared to the share histori- 
cally held by crude oil) of the primary energy market are supplied by gas. Gas 
successfully penetrated the thermal market but given a 35 percent demand for 
specific (nonsubstitutable) liquid fuels any additional expansion will call for gas 
to  be offered to final consumers in liquid form. 
South firope. In general the economies of South European countries are 
less developed than the  other Western European economies. In terms of Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap) the value of Central Europe is more 
than twice that of South Europe. In 1980 the energy intensity in South Europe 
or energy input per dollar GDP produced was slightly above the energy intensity 
of Central Europe. Hence, any narrowing of the gap in the economic well-being 
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between South Europe and the  remaining regions of Western Europe implies 
energy consumption growth rates in South Europe considerably higher than 
those in the  other Western European regions. The useful energy demand 
development derived from the  low projections of the TEA [3] reflect the  aspira- 
tions of South Europe's economies t o  improve their relative economic position 
within Europe. As will be seen later this translates into the highest primary 
energy growth ra e s  of all regions of Western Europe. 
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The resource situation of South Europe is the  poorest in Western Europe. 
With the exception of Italy, oil and gas resources a re  practically nonexisting, 
while the  situation for coal is  only somewhat better. Spain and Yugoslavia have 
some coal reserves but  they are  barely sufficient to satisfy their domestic 
needs. Nuclear power has recently reached the threshold of becoming an  
important energy source for the  future. since the potential of hydropower has 
not  been fully exploited so far some additional 15 to 20 GW could come online in 
the  future. 
-- 10 
The 1980 primary energy consumption profile of South Europe is dom- 
inated by the  highest oil dependence of Western Europe, i.e. 64 percent of pri- 
mary energy consumption; coal use accounted for 16 percent, and gas con- 
sumption for 10 percent. Given the poor resource availability of South Europe, 
the  energy import dependence is significant: Oil more than 95 percent, coal 41 
percent, and natural gas 54 percent. 
Italy is the only country of South Europe that  has a large-scale gas infras- 
t ructure in place. In 1980 16 percent of the domestic primary energy consurnp 
tion was supplied by gas, of which more than 50 percent was imported. How- 
ever, gas distribution systems, partly originating from the town-gas era, a re  
being expanded or  newly constructed in most of the  nations of South Europe. 
There are a number of ex-ante reasons which justify the  expectations for  
natural gas as a major fuel in South Europe's future energy supply. First, this 
regional energy system has not yet reached the  level of complexity, say, of 
North Europe. Second, the  high energy demand growth rates assumed reduce 
the  necessity for competition, so that  gas could succeed in meeting the  addi- 
tional demand. Third, although the  oil import dependence of this region cannot 
be reduced by natural gas, the  expanded use of gas would comply with the  
regional policy of import diversification. 
The Base Case calculations result in the  expected substitution of gas for oil 
in final energy markets. However the  sectoral allocations of the  substitution 
processes are  someRrhat surprising. In the  household and service sectors, gas 
looses its market shares both in absolute and relative terms, while that  of light 
oil expands drastically. Electricity and solid fuels maintain their absolute con- 
tributions but decline in their relative importance. 
In the  industrial sectors a totally opposite development picture emerges. 
Gas increases its, market share from 23 to  70 percent during the study period, 
displacing all its competitors, in particular fuel oil (which decreases its share 
in final energy from 45 to  14.7 percent). 
The explanations for this outcome are  straightforward. The energy 
demand densities in South Europe are much lower than in Central Europe. 
Additionally, the climatological conditions require less space heating, decreas- 
ing demand densities even further. Since GATE-I operates with a single average 
demand density. i t  does not distinguish between rural and urban areas; the  
average applied in these calculations is too low t o  be able to distinguish 
between gas use in household and service sectors. Industrial consumers usually 
consume larger-scale quantities and also require a less complex distribution 
infrastructure. Hence, natural gas is the  preferred fuel in these sectors. 
The primary energy consumption of South Europe is depicted in Figure 9. 
Natural gas and nuclear power expand their  market shares drastically a t  the  
expense of crude oil and coal. By the end of the  study horizon gas holds a share 
of 31 percent, crude oil of 42 percent,  nuclear and hydropower 10 percent each, 
and coal 7 percent. Given the  reduction of gas use in the  household and service 
sectors, the large contribution of natural  gas to  primary energy supply must  be 
the  result of gas' penetration into the  electricity generation sector. 
The electricity sector is marked by the phase out  of all coal- and oil-fired 
power stations by the  end of this century. Initially the fast introduction of 
nuclear power plants and the  additions of hydropower capacities substitute for 
fossil fuels. As of 1990 gas-fired power plants are  installed a t  an increasing rate. 
By the  year 2010 natural gas fuels more than one-third of all electricity pro- 
duced. 
The Base Case results for South Europe show the expected major increase 
in gas consumption. However, the  dynamics of the substitution processes of 
gas for other  fuels, a s  well as  a careful distinction of energy demand density 
k e a s ,  e.g into urban and rural areas, must  be further analyzed. 
East Europe. The dominant component of the  East European energy sys- 
tem is coal which in 1980 supplied 56 percent of this region's primary energy 
consumption of 579 GWyr. All countries in the  region have sufficient coal and 
lignite resources but often of such low quality that  extraction is difficult in 
te rms of both economics and the  environment. Poland. the  German Demo- 
cratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia posses the  region's largest coal resources 
and are the  largest coal producers. Poland's production exceeds their domestic 
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Figure 9. South Europe: Primary Energy Consumption or Equivalent, 1980- 
2010, Base Case. 
needs and some 14 percent of their ID80 production were exported. In general, 
as coal is the only significant energy resource of the region, most countries' 
energy plans call for increased production in the future. 
The resource situation with respect to oil and natural gas does not appear 
to be as bright. Apart from Rumania there are only insignificant oil resources 
available and the  Rumanian reserve-to-production ratio has been declining 
recently a t  rates that  suggest that  their oil fields will be depleted before the  
end of this century. In ID80 Rumania's oil production did not suffice in meeting 
domestic oil needs, and Like all the other East European countries Rumania had 
to import oil. The natural gas resource picture is similar to that  of oil. 
Rumania, and to a lesser extent Hungary and Poland, have some gas resources, 
but the domestic production levels fall short of meeting domestic consumption 
needs. Consequently all East European countries are large importers of crude 
oil and natural gas. Most of these imports are supplied by the USSR but in cases 
where allocated import quotas were surpassed oil had to be imported from the  
Middle East against hard currency payments. In 1980 crude oil and natural gas 
contributed 25 and 15 percent. repectively, to primary energy supply. 
The Base Case scenario specification concerning the useful energy demand 
projections (see Table 4), the dynamic capacity constraints and the general 
energy policy for East Europe are the result of private communication with 
experts from the C M M  countries. The energy policy assumptions of this 
analysis reflect the objective of maximizing self-sufficiency. This corresponds 
to minimizing oil and natural gas imports and expanding national coal and 
nuclear programs to their limits. 
The high (compared. to the Western European regions) final energy demand 
growth rate of 2.4 percent per year in this analysis puts enormous pressure on 
the East European energy supply system. Even with optimistic assumptions 
regarding the capacity expansion of domestic coal extraction in this region the  
high share of coal in primary energy supply cannot be sustained (coal output 
rises by some 70 percent from 323 GWyr to  550 GWyr over the s t u d i  horizon), 
and coal's contribution to  primary energy supply declines to  52 percent' (see 
Figure 10). 
I Nuclear I - ~ ~- 
Hydro 
I I 
0-0,- o 
Figure 10. East Europe: Primary Energy Consumption or Equivalent, 
1980-2010, Base Case. 
Crude oil consumption declines until 1990 in absolute and relative terms 
but thereafter grows again a t  a slightly lower ra te  than total primary energy 
consumption. By 2010 some 220 GWyr of crude oil a re  being consumed (1980: 
144 GWyr). The reason for this rebound of oil use is the rapidly groning demand 
for specific liquid fuels. While during the eighties conservation efforts and 
interfuel substitution permit a reduction in oil consumption this cannot be 
continued any longer after 1990 given the assumed final energy growth profile. 
Natural gas replaces liquid fuels in the industrial sectors and t o  a lesser 
extent in the household and service sectors' thermal energy supply, while 
nuclear power and hydropower substitute for coal, oil, and gas in electricity 
generation. By 2010 some 50 GW(e) of nuclear power will have to be installed in 
East Europe to meet  electricity demand. Gas increases its market share  from 
15 percent to  21 percent by 2010. nuclear from 1.3 to  9.5 percent. while hydro- 
power maintains its 1980 share of approximately 1.5 percent. 
A brief look a t  the development of final energy supply (see Figure 11) shows 
the  increasing contribution of all energy carriers. In relative terms this is only 
t rue  for solids and natural gas; for liquid fuels and, surprisingly despite the  
considerable expansion of nuclear power, for electricity there are declines. 
These trends, however, a re  different in the household/service sectors and the  
industrial sectors. In the  former sector solids (coal) and light oil increase in 
absolute and relative terms, natural gas increases slightly in absolute use (but 
declines in share), and electricity decreases in absolute terms. In the  
Solids 
- t 
Figure 11. East Europe: Final Energy Consumption or Equivalent, 1980- 
2010, Base Case. 
industrial sectors gas doubles its market share to 40 percent displacing liquid 
fuels, solids. and electricity a t  varying rates. While solids and electricity are 
still growing in absolute terms, liquid fuels use declines significantly during the  
initial periods and grows again towards the end of the study period. Again this 
development is a consequence of the specific liquid fuel demand and the  opera- 
tion modes of the refineries. There is simply too much residual fuel oil avail- 
able which is best used for fueling large industrial boilers. 
In summary, these preliminary results provide some insights into the  
development of the East European energy system. However, more analysis is 
needed. Specially, more detailed information is needed on end-use conversion, 
such as energy demand densities, conversion efficiencies, equipment's age 
structure,  etc. 
NATURAL GAS PRODUCJlON AND TRADE 
In 1980 natural gas contributed about 15 percent or 258 GWyr to Western 
European primary energy consumption. Interregional gas trade (excluding 
trade within the CMEA block) accounted for 79.2 GWyr or roughly one-third of 
total gas consumption. In terms of gas import dependence, some 5 percent of 
total primary energy consumption in Western Europe originated from nonindi- 
genous regional gas fields. The breakdown of the gas import dependence of 
Western Europe (in relation to natural gas consumption) according to  the prin- 
cipal exporting regions is as follows: USSR 13.1 percent, North Africa 2.4 per- 
cent. North Sea 12.5 percent., and 2.7 percent interregional trade among the 
Western European regions. East Europe imported 37 percent of its domestic gas 
needs exclusively from the USSR. 
In the  Base Case scenario the market for natural gas doubles by the  year 
2010, reaching some 27 percent of primary energy consumption or 534 GWyr. 
During the study period the gas import dependence of Western Europe 
increases from 30 t o  66 percent. In terms of primary energy consumption this 
implies a dependence of 18 percent. The origins of the  gas imports are shown 
in Table 6. 
Table 6. Natural Gas Imports per Origin in GWyr and in Percent of Primary En- 
ergy Consumption of Western Europe. 
Region 1980 1990 2000 2010 
USSR 33.8 (1.9) 105.6 (6.0) 144.0 (7.7) 192.1 (9.6) 
North Sea 32.2 (1.8) 38.5 (2.2) 64.1 (3.4) 77.8 (3.9) 
North Africa 6.1 (0.4) 31.3 (1.8) 62.9 (3.4) 88.2 (4.4) 
The sources of regional gas supply vary between regions and depend on 
domestic resource availability and their extraction costs a s  well as  on the  geo- 
graphic location relative to  the exporting regions. According t o  Table 7 North 
Europe imports 100 percent of its gas needs from the  USSR, the  North Sea and 
Central Europe (Denmark). In the  light of the  gas import price patterns 
assumed in the  Base Case the option of drilling for deep gas does not seem to  be 
economic. 
Table 7. Sources of Gas, North Europe (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
North Sea - - 4.4 7.8 
Soviet Union 1.2 2.9 2.9 2.8 
Central Europe - - 0.5 0.9 
Total 1.2 2.9 7.8 11.5 
Apart from a steadily increasing gas import dependence, natural gas supply 
of Central Europe is characterized by a decline of domestic extraction activities 
until the tu rn  of the  century; thereafter a rebound of indigenous production 
occurs which puts production back to  the  1980 level. As will be explained later. 
this development is  the  direct result of the  gas exporters' price-quantity rela- 
tions (i.e. t h e  elasticity functions which reflect the  willingness to export a t  a 
certain price) underlying the Base Case scenario. The gas extraction profile of 
Central Europe shows a gradual transition from current  low production cost 
resource categories towards higher cost categories. For example, by the  year 
2010 the  traditional on-shore resources (on-shore 1 in Table 8) have been 
totally depleted and replaced by more costly on-shore and off-shore resource 
categories. 
The gas imports grow steadily (almost by a factor of four) over the entire 
study period. The origins of these imports vary over the study period (see Table 
8). Up to the  year 2000 all three principal exporting regions expand their gas 
deliveries t o  Central Europe. During this period the  Soviet Union replaces the  
North Sea as  the  largest gas supplier to  Central Europe. The Soviet gas market 
share could have been even larger if the  export capacity. i.e. the  trunk lines 
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Table 8. Sources of Gas, Central Europe (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Domestic 
Onshore 1 85.0 47.2 12.8 - 
Onshore 2 35.0 53.5 79.2 96.6 
Offshore 1 46.2 46.4 27.8 16.6 
Offshore 2 6.1 15.8 41.1 
Total 166.2 153.3 135.6 154.3 
Imports 
North Sea 32.3 38.5 59.7 69.9 
Soviet Union 22.2 58.6 96.7 146.4 
North Africa 2.3 20.0 
Total 56.8 117.1 156.4 216.3 
from Urengoy to Central Europe, would have a larger capacity. The export stra- 
tegy of the USSR is approximated by shaping the supply elasticity function so 
that  Soviet gas prices underbid any non-European competitor by 10 percent. 
The export sales potential, however, is limited by the existing and planned 
long-distance trunk line capacities linking Siberia with Western Europe. This 
opens the opportunity for North African gas to participate successfully in the  
gas export sales competition in Central Europe. During the 1990s North African 
gas contributes some 17 percent, the North Sea 33 percent, and the  USSR 50 
percent to the gas imports to Central Europe. After the  turn  of the  century the  
Soviet Union enlarge their gas export capacities a t  a ra te  tha t  would permit 
their price advantage to  push North African gas out of the Central European 
market. 
By the end of the study period the  Soviet Union exports 146 GWyr of natural 
gas to Central Europe which corresponds to a share of 68 percent of this 
region's gas exports. This export volume requires the field errection of three to 
four trunk lines similar to the one currently being put into operation for the  
transport of Siberian gas to Western Europe. 
The North Sea supplies the remaining 32 percent or 70 GWyr of Central 
Europe's gas import needs. This export volume is the result of pure  economic 
considerations a t  the aggregate level of Europe and thus does not reflect 
current  or future Norwegian gas export strategies. Table 9 contains the  natural 
gas extraction profile of the North Sea which once more depicts the inevitable 
transition toward costlier gas resource categories. 
Table 9. Extraction Profile for North Sea Gas (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Cheap 1 33.5 29.8 27.0 22.06 
Cheap 2 - 9.5 20.4 30.3 
Expensive 1 - - 18.0 27.0 
Expensive 2 - - - - 
Total 33.5 39.3 65.4 79.2 
Although South Europe's domestic gas production increases slightly from 
18 to  25 GWyr-by shifting to  the higher extraction cost resource category--the 
domestic gas supply remains insignificant compared to  the  import require- 
men t s  (see Table 10). Gas imports from the  USSR grow- fourfold between 1960 
and 1990 to some 40 GWyr/yr and remain constant until 2010. North African 
gas flows se t  in slowly and replace former imports from Central Europe (i.e. the  
Netherlands). Between 1990 and 2000, however, North African gas export 
explodes from 10 GWyr t o  61 GWyr. Thereafter North African gas sales to South 
Europe 'continue to  grow but  a t  a more modest rate  and reach 86 GWyr/yr by 
the  year 2010. 
Table 10. Sources of Gas, South Europe (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
1980 1990 2000 201 0 
Domestic 
Cheap 18.2 13.9 7.1 - 
Expensive - 10.0 25.0 25.0 
Total 18.2 23.9 32.1 25.0 
Imports 
Soviet Union 10.4 42.6 42.6 40.5 
Central Europe 7.0 7.0 - - 
Northern Africa 3.8 10.0 6 1.7 86.4 
Total 21.2 59.6 104.3 126.9 
At this point i t  is  helpful to  look a t  the  export functions of the USSR and 
North Africa in some greater  detail. One principal s ta tement  made above con- 
cerned the  USSR export price strategy of underbidding non-European competi- 
tors  by 10 percent. Clearly, a strict application of this strategy within a cost 
minimization approach would result in a total dependence on Soviet gas of all 
gas importing regions, and North African gas would be pushed out of the  
market.  In order t o  avoid this unrealistic situation the  following pricing 
method was introduced: The export price elasticity functions were disaggre- 
gated into discrete categories of fixed quantities and prices (elasticity 
categories) by means  of step functions. The Soviet gas sales price is 10 percent 
lower per comparable elasticity category. This implies tha t  Soviet gas has an 
initial cost advantage compared to other gas exporters. When the allocated 
quantity per  lowest category is depleted and the  next (more expensive) 
category becomes effective i t  may well be that  the  lowest categories of the  
approximated North African export function break even and are competitive. 
This procedure and the  aggregate cost minimization objective function 
deployed in this study lead t o  the South European gas import pattern depicted 
in Table 10. Soviet and North African gas exports a re  assumed to follow the  
price-quantity relations as shown previously in Figure 2. In the Base Case the  
North African gas  exports lag behind the  USSR sales by approximately one elas- 
ticity category per  t ime interval (see Tables lla and l lb) .  In other words, the  
cost  minimizing objective raises the export sales up  to  the  full limit of an 
exporter's elasticity category before the next one or  the competitor's category 
a r e  allocated. The fifth elasticity category of the USSR turns  out t o  be costlier 
than the  expensive-to-extract domestic gas resources of Central Europe. Conse- 
quently gas imports do not expand beyond the  fourth category and domestic 
gas production increases again. 
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Table 1 la. Gas Export Profile for the Soviet Union (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
Elasticity p rpea  
Class $10 BTU 1980 1990 2000 2010 
1 3.3 34 50.0 50 50 
2 4.0 - 50.0 50 50 
3 4.7 - 10.0 5 0 50 
4 5.4 - - - 50 
5 6.0 - - - - 
a ~ o r  these prices the same growth rates as for oil and coal imports are assumed 
(see Table 3). 
Table 1 1 b. Gas Export Profile for Northern Africa (GWyr/yr), Base Case. 
- - - - 
Electricity pri8ee 
Class $/I0 BTU 1980 1990 2000 2010 
1 3.7 6.0 30 30 30 
2 4.4 - 3 30 30 
3 5.2 - - 4 30 
4 5.9 - - - - 
5 6.6 - - - - 
'For these prices the same growth rates as  for oil and coal imports are assumed 
(see Table 3). 
North African gas exports to  Central Europe fill a temporary bottleneck 
when the Soviet pipeline capacity build-up constraints hold back additional 
exports. After this capacity bottleneck has been overcome, North African gas 
prices a t  burner tip become unattractive due to the gas transport costs to  Cen- 
tral Europe. The shorter distance to South Europe offsets this disadvantage and 
North African gas sales exceed USSR exports. 
The gas trade pattern which emerged from the Base Case showed some 
interesting features regarding the origins of natural gas imports of the Western 
European regions. By and large the critical parameters determining the gas 
trade flows are the elasticity categories of the  USSR and North Africa and, t o  a 
lesser extent, the  gas transport infrastructure costs. The next paragraphs will 
attempt to  cast some light on the question of the sensitivity of gas trade to  
varied export elasticity functions. 
ALTERNATIVE GAS MPOm EIASTlm FUNCITJONS 
The sensitivity analysis of the gas trade pattern to changes in gas export 
prices is based on two different sets of export price elasticities. Common to  
both sets is the elimination of the 10 percent price differential between Soviet 
and North African gas export prices per comparable elasticity category. The 
first set labeled Low Price (LP) assumes the adjustment of the North African 
prices to the level of USSR export prices. The second test,, labeled High Prices 
(HP), assumes the  reverse adjustment, i.e. Soviet prices are raised to  the North 
African level previously applied in the Base Case. All other exogenous a s s u mp  
tions are identical with the Base Case scenario. 
The likely effects of the Low Price scenario which improves the competi- 
tiveness of North African gas exports in Western European energy markets may 
be 
- Gas import diversification or simply a step towards a buyer's market; 
- An expansion of the  regional gas markets, i.e a higher rate of interfuel sub- 
stitution; 
- A combination of the two. 
The LP scenario is a representative case of the combined effect. 
Cas h p o r t  Diversification. North African gas exports to South Europe 
increase by more than 30 percent (compared to the Base Case) and reach 114 
GWyr/yr by 2010. The total gas imports of South Europe, however, remains con- 
stant,  while domestic gas production equals the Base Case development. Conse- 
quently the imports from the USSR were reduced by exactly the  increase in 
North Africa's exports. Actually, without the constraint of a maximum 90 per- 
cent gas import dependence on a single exporter, the switch to North African 
gas would have been 100 percent. Given the  price parity of USSR and North Afri- 
can gas at  the respective entry points to Western Europe, as modeled in GATE-I, 
i.e. the Western European border for the USSR gas and the gas fields (net backs) 
for North African gas, this switch from USSR to  North African gas implies that in 
the Base Case the Soviet exports to Western Europe are physically or economi- 
cally limited, e.g. due to  dynamic build-up constraints regarding the gas trans- 
port infrastructure or  the  shape of the export price elasticity function. Other- 
wise the Base Case exports of the Soviet Union should have been higher by the 
equivalent amount of the increase in North African gas exports in the LP 
scenario. 
Market Ezpansion. The changes in the gas import s tructure of South Europe 
cause notable changes in the  energy system of Central Europe, while North 
Europe is not affected a t  all. The additional gas export quantities available a t  an 
approximately 10 percent discount per elasticity category are  immediately 
absorbed by the Central European market expanding the share of natural gas 
from 27 percent (Base Case) to 30 percent (LP). This points to  a relatively 
price-elastic gas market. 
The expansion of natural gas in Central Europe further displaces liquid fuel 
use in the household and service sectors, while the effects on the industrial 
sectors are negligible. 
The H P s c e n a h  reverses the effects of the LP scenario on Central Europe, 
while North and South Europe maintain the gas import structure of the Base 
Case. By the year 2010 natural gas imports from the USSR are  reduced from 
146 GWyr (Base Case) t o  99 GWyr, causing an identical increase in crude oil 
imports. 
In summary, despite of the  high degree of aggregation of the GATE-I model. 
the model's resporises to a 10 percent, change in gas expoit prices of a particu- 
lar egporter are  remarkable. Clearly, further analysis is required to fully 
comprehend the dynamics of the changes in the gas trade flows as well as the  
cause/effect relations of price variations on the  market  potential of natural 
gas. Furthermore, historically gas trade has been based on bilateral negotia- 
tions where the trade partners usually start  off with conflicting objectives. So 
far there are no signs tha t  this is going to change in the  near future. Therefore 
it  will be necessary t o  extend the analysis of gas trade in Europe by incorporat- 
ing the multi-objective optimization approach along the  lines laid out in [4]. 
SUPPLY SECUFUTY SCENARIO 
Natural gas supply security considerations provide the  background for  
another model test: the  maximum gas import dependence of any Western Euro- 
pean region on any single exporter is reduced from the  Base Case value of 90 
percent to  50 percent of total gas imports. 
The consequence of lowering the ceiling of the  gas import dependence of a 
region is either a price-induced or physically enforced decline in gas use. The 
first response reflects the  fact that  originally cost effective gas imports have t o  
be replaced by other gas imports or by stepped-up domestic production, both of 
which are  costlier than the  initial gas supplies. The second reason for a reduc- 
tion in regional gas consumption may be the  lack of domestic resources or 
import diversification alternatives. 
The regional responses t o  this import ceiling are  not uniform and reflect 
the particular position of their  energy system within the overall European con- 
text. For example, Central Europe, the largest gas consuming and importing 
region in Europe, purchased 60 percent of its gas imports from the USSR (Base 
Case). The import ceiling reduces imports from the USSR by some 40 GWyr and 
increases imports from North Africa (24 GWyr) to  the  North Sea (2 GWyr) 
slightly. The lat ter  is actually the amount of gas forfeited by North Europe in 
order to  meet i ts  50 percent constraint. Other adjustments of Central Europe 
concern an increase in domestic production by 6 GWyr and a 17 GWyr or  5 per- 
cent  reduction by 2010 in gas consumption, which is a price- induced response 
of consumers to the  higher gas price level. 
The lower export potential of USSR gas to Central Europe benefits other  
regions. South Europe switches from North African gas (which holds a 70 per- 
cent  import share in the  Base Case) to  Soviet gas and maintains a 50 percent 
balance between those two exporters. A similar switch of suppliers occurs in 
North Europe, but a t  a much smaller scale. Here North Sea gas is displaced by 
Soviet gas and, as already mentioned, diverted to Central Europe. And to close 
the  circle, North African gas regains part  of the  market lost to  the  USSR in 
South Europe by capturing partly the USSR losses in Central Europe. 
The imposed import dependence ceiling results in a restructuring of the  
gas trade flows. An adverse effect on gas consumption is a regional 
phenomenom observed only in Central Europe. All other regions maintain t h e  
level of domestic gas production and consumption. Hence, they simply switch 
from one exporting region to  another. The present pilot version of GATE-I is 
still too rough a model for the  detailed anlysis of the  trade-offs between cost 
optimality and supply security. The answers to such questions will be tackled 
within the detailed modeling activity on international gas trade issues. 
ENERGY CONSUMITON AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
The combustion of fossil fuels has been associated with the emissions of 
numerous oxides of which carbon dioxide (CO ), sulfur dioxides (SOZ). or  nitro- 
gen oxides (NOx) have been given special a f tention in public debates, mass 
media, etc. SO2 and NOx a r e  held responsible for t h e  adverse environmental 
impacts commonly labeled damage caused by acid rain. In order to gain bet ter  
understanding of the  order of magnitude of such emissions in the long run, 
Gate-l accounts for all SO and NO emissions along t h e  entire energy chain, P x i.e. not only of t h e  centra conversion complexes but  also of the transport and 
end-use conversion systems. In future modeling activities, especially when 
deploying the  multi-objective approach, environmental objectives will be taken 
into consideration as one principal counterforce to pure cost and price objec- 
tives. Within t h e  context of this study the potential consequences of strictly 
imposed emission standards on the future development of regional energy sys- 
tems will be presented. 
Figures 12 and 13 show the SO2 and N O  emissions associated with t h e  Base 
Case energy consumption per region. One k o u l d  note t h a t  the Base Case does 
not assume any environmental protection activities. and the emissions shown 
in Figures 12 and 13 reflect a business-as-usual situation with respect to SO2 
and NOx emissions. The steep increases in these emissions observed during the  
last two decades seem to be mitigated in the  Base Case. The low energy growth 
rates associated with a modest economic outlook, the  achievements in the  field 
of energy efficiency improvements and conservation. and the  notable substitu- 
tion of natural gas, nuclear, and hydropower for coal and oil products result in 
the reversal of t h e  pollutant emissions in all European regions with the  excep- 
tion of East Europe. 
Within a region the trends of SO2 and NO emissions followr similar direc- 
tions, but  their orders of magnitude are quite aifferent. For example, in North 
Europe hydro- and nuclear-generated electricity substitute for oil products 
throughout the  regional economy. The combustion of solids remains almost 
constant and consequently i t  is possible to reduce SO2 emissions by some 30 
percent by the  year 2010. In contrast, NOx emission are reduced only by 8 per- 
cent. This is the  consequence of the market penetration of natural gas which is 
practically sulfur-free but still produces NOx when combusted with air. 
South Europe exhibits similar trends for very much the same reasons as 
North Europe. SO2 emissions are reduced more than 40 percent, while NOx 
emissions decline only 1 percent. However, in 1980 North and South Europe 
together accounted for only 10 percent of Europe's SO2 and 20 percent of NOx 
emissions. The bulk of these emissions occurs in Central and East Europe. For 
example, these two regions produce jointly and in equal shares 90 percent of 
Europe's SO releases. In the Base Case, Central Europe's SO emissions 
decline due to  t h e  substitution of natural gas for oil use and the stagnation in 
coal consumption t o  90 percent of the 1980 emissions. In contrast to  Central 
Europe coal production and consumption grow in East Europe and so do SO2 
releases. By the  year 2010 the SO emissions of East Europe range some 45 per- 
cent above the  1980 emissions. &ever. the  growth of a factor 1.45 is less than 
the primary energy growth of a factor of 1.7 over the study horizon as coal fuels 
only part of this  expansion of primary energy use. 
NOx emissions in Central Europe decline slightly by 5 percent which 
clearly is a consequence of the  enhanced natural gas consumption. In East 
Europe N O  emissions rise by some 33 percent.  This points to the increasingly 
lower quamy of domestic coal resources this  region is forced to extract  in 
order to meet  i ts  energy supply expectations. 
Figure 12. SO2 Emissions, Base Case (billions tons per year). 
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Figure 13. NO, Emissions, Base Case (billion tons per year). 
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LIMITED SO2 EXISIONS 
The following paragraphs attempt to cast some light on the role of natural 
gas in regional energy supplies assuming growing environmental concerns 
about the impacts of SO releases and subsequently the damages caused by 
acid rain. Apart from fue 7 switching the  model offers alternative measures for 
SO2 emission reductions. All centralized fossil fuel conversion plants in indus- 
tries and the electricity sector may be furnished with desulfurization equip- 
ment. The relation between costs and effective abatement results in terms of 
fractions of SO2 retained are shown in Table 12. 
In this test application of the GATE-I model maximum SO2 emissions per 
year are imposed on the regional energy systems of Europe (see Table 13). The 
results of these emission ceilings with respect to the tw70 principal options for 
bringing about the prescribed reductions are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14 confronts the sulfur emission for the year 2010 of the  Base Case 
with the Limited SO2 Case and shows the means by which these reductions are 
achieved, i.e. the tons of SO not released to the environment by installing 
?I abatement measures and by s ifts within the composition of energy consump- 
tion. The data in Table 14 indicate that  about two-thirds of the SO2 reductions 
originate from capital investment in abatement measures--a uniform develop- 
ment in almost all regions with significant fossil fuel dependence of their 
energy systems. 
Given the higher dependence of Central and East Europe on coal, these 
regions face more difficulties in meeting the demanded SO reductions than 
South or North Europe. Central Europe deploys desulfuriza&on equipment in 
all major coal and fuel oil fired conversion plants. In addition, gas consumption 
is stepped up by 33 percent or 126 GWyr. substituting 60 GWyr for coal and 40 
GWyr for fuel oil by the year 2010. 
Over and above the large-scale investments in abatement equipment East 
Europe has to cut coal combustion significantly in order to meet the required 
SO2 standards. Altogether some 160 GWyr of coal have to be replaced by other 
energy carriers. Similar to  Central Europe, East Europe also increases gas con- 
sumption, but only to  a much smaller extent, i.e. 7 percent or 17 GWyr. Con- 
trary to all other regions oil products displace coal and grow by some 115 GWyr 
(70 percent increase compared t o  the Base Case) by the end of'the study period. 
Parts of the  investment expenditures on abatement equipment are allocated to 
these new oil conversion plants. Otherwise the postulated SO2 emission levels 
cannot be achieved. 
Compared to the Base Case, in the  Limited SO2 scenario natural gas con- 
sumption of Western Europe grows by 22 percent or 117 GWyr by the year 2010. 
Certainly, this increase in gas consumption will exert pressure on the  
domestic/regional gas markets and on the  pattern of interregional gas trade. 
Tables 15 to  17 depict the  sources of natural gas for the different regions 
for the year 2010 (for comparison with Base Case data consult Tables 7 to  10). 
Central and South Europe add deep gas extraction to their domestic gas supply. 
The reduction of the 1985 level of SO emissions to 30 percent by 2010 puts 
severe pressure on these energy sy$ems. Conventional gas resources are 
already utilized in the Base Case a t  a maximum rate and additional imports 
become more and more expensive. Hence the deep gas alternative is being 
explored and utilized by the year 2010 and 32 and 46 GWyr are produced in Cen- 
tral and South Europe, respectively. The domestic gas production profiles in 
the other regions remain unchanged. 
Table 12. Cost and Effectiveness of Desulfurization. 
Limit on Desulfurization Cost of Desulfurization 
[% of emission] [$/kg SO2 removed] [mills/kwh(e)la 
50% 0.70 2.4 
80% 1.03 5.7 
a Calculated for a coal- fired power plant. 
Table 13. Limits on SO2 Emissions (million tons per year).a 
Region 1985 1990 2000 20 10 
% Reduction 0 30 50 70 
North Europe 1041 739 546 347 
Central Europe 22,428 15,738 11,757 7468 
South Europe 3932 2808 2196 1465 
East Europe 22,561 16,754 14,898 11,711 
a~educ t ions  are in te rms of percent per unit of energy use. 
Table 14. Reduction of Emissions by Type of Measure, 2010 (million tons per 
year). 
Emission Emission Desulfuri- . Change of 
Region Base Case Low SO2 zation Fuel Mix 
North Europe 728 347 351 30 
Central Europe 20,375 7468 8266 4641 
South Europe 2232 1465 508 259 
East Europe 32,587 11,711 13,398 7478 
Total 55.922 20,99 1 22,523 12,488 
Percent 100 3 8 40 22 
The gas trade pattern is modified significantly and affects all regions but 
the  North Sea. On the  exporters' side the  Soviet Union and North Africa move 
u p  one category on their  export price elasticity curve which results in addi- 
tional gas sales on the  order of 58 GWyr (up 16 percent) and 30 GWyr (up 33 per- 
cent). On the  importers' side some unexpected trade flows are realized. For 
example, in spite of increased natural gas consumption in South Europe, the  
region reduces gas  imports by some 22 GWyr. However, this decline in gas 
imports is more than offset by the  newly irltroduced deep gas production. 
Furthermore, South Europe switches its external gas suppliers. Imports from 
the USSR are reduced by 75 percent, while North African gas increases by 10 
percent. At a first glance these substitutions within the  gas sector of South 
Europe may appear somewhat strange, but a brief impact analysis of the  S O  
constraint on Central Europe will provide sufficient evidence for this "optimal R 
behavior of the  South European region. 
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Table 15. Sources of Gas, North Europe (GWyr/yr) (limited SO2 emissions). 
1900 1990 2000 2010 
North Sea - - 0.1 - 
Soviet Union 1.2 2.9 7.7 10.0 
Central Europe - - 0.0 - 
Total 1.2 2.9 7.8 10.0 
Table 16. Sources of Gas. Central Europe ( ~ ~ y r / y r )  (limited SO2 emissions). 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Domestic 
Onshore 1 85.0 47.2 12.8 - 
Onshore 2 35.0 53.5 79.2 96.6 
Offshore 1 46.2 46.4 27.8 16.6 
Offshore 2 6.1 15.0 41.1 
Deep - - - 31.6 
Total 166.2 153.3 135.6 185.9 
Imports 
North Sea 32.3 30.5 64.0 77.6 
Soviet Union 22.2 76.1 143.9 210.2 
North Africa 2.3 20.0 - 19.7 
Tot a1 56.8 134.6 207.9 307.5 
Table 17. Sources of Gas. South Europe (GH'yr/yr) (limited SO2 emissions). 
1080 1990 2000 2010 
Domestic 
Cheap 18.2 13.9 7.1 - 
Expensive - 10.0 25.0 25.0 
Deep - - - 46.3 
Total 18.2 23.9 32.1 71.3 
Imports 
Soviet Union 10.4 25.3 17.8 10.5 
Central Europe 7.0 8.0 - - 
Northern Africa 3.8 10.0 86.4 94.3 
Total 21.2 43.3 104.2 104.8 
The large quantities of SO2 emission reductions imposed on Central Europe 
forces this region not only to exhaust all additional gas import possibilities, but 
also to attract gas flows originally allocated for North and South Europe. The 
USSR gas export quantities released by South European deep gas production 
and import shifts are totally absorbed by Central Europe. Similar shifts but on 
a smaller scale occur in North Europe. Soviet gas replaces gas from the  North 
Sea which in turn is directly allocated to Central Europe. Furthermore, Central 
Europe consumes most of the additional exports from the Soviet Union. By 
2010 Central Europe also resumes imports from North Africa which in all other 
scenarios are discontinued after the year 2000. 
The reallocation of USSR and North Sea gas to Central Europe a t  the  
expense of South and North Europe, respectively, is the result of the particular 
objective function in the GATE-I model. The objective is to arrive a t  an aggre- 
gate optimum (and thus regional optima may well be disregarded). Therefore, 
given the adverse situation in Central Europe with respect to the fulfillment of 
the SO constraint, Soviet gas previously exported to  South Europe is diverted 
to ~ e n f r a l  Europe. 
In summary, the Limited SO2 scenario results in a considerably higher gas 
share in Western Europe's primary energy supply (33 percent) compared to the  
Base Case (27 percent). The numerical findings of the Limited SO2 scenario 
show the potential for natural gas to  alleviate the problems associated with the  
combustion of oil and coal. However. the increase in gas consumption as a 
result of SO2 emission constraints account for only one-third of the postulated 
emission reductions. The remaining two-thirds require the installation of 
capital-intensive desulfurization equipment. At this point the model results are 
too preliminary to justify a deeper analysis of the trade-offs between abatement 
measures, fuel switching, and energy conservation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main incentive in the development of the GATE-I model was to have a t  
hand a small but versatile mathematical tool, adequate to analyze the competi- 
tiveness of natural gas versus other fuels at  burner tip. Furthermore this effort 
served as a pilot case in the  development and application of the detailed and 
more sophisticated regional models. The application of GATE-I to the European 
regions demonstrated the operationality and usefulness of this model. Given 
the simplifications necessary to keep the model small and fast in its computa- 
tional requirements, the  main objectives have certainly been met. The 
numbers and interpretations throughout this paper should be seen as part  of 
this learning and development process and therefore not be taken at  face value. 
This pilot study left many questions open and even more questions unasked 
which will definitely be addressed in the coming round of research activities 
within the frame of IIASA's International Gas Study. 
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